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Litigation Update
new Jersey v. epa
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*

introDuction
On February 8, 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated two Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) actions, the first to delist mercury emitting coal and
oil-fired electric utility steam
generation units (“EGUs”) from
section 112 of the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”), and the second to limit
mercury emissions, under the
much less restrictive, CCA section 111 with the new Clean Air
Mercury Rule (“CAMR”).1 The
suit was filed by the state of New
Jersey, along with thirteen other
states, environmental organizations, and industrial groups.2

legal backgrounD
anD argumentS

In 2000, in response to an EPA study linking anthropogenic
releases of mercury with methylmercury levels in fish, EPA
Administrator announced as “appropriate and necessary”6 the
listing of coal- and oil-fired EGUs as source categories for HAPs
under section 112.7 Coal and oil
EGUs are the largest anthropogenic source emitters of mercury
in the United States. In 2004
EPA revisited its decision of
listing coal- and oil-fired EGUs.
After reviewing a number of
alternatives EPA decided to delist coal- and oil-fired EGUs as
HAP sources under section 112
and institute the less restrictive
Clean Air Mercury Rule. Under
the CAMR, EPA proposed to
limit mercury emissions from
new and existing coal and oil
EGUs, and develop a voluntary cap-and-trade program to
reduce mercury emissions.8
The petitioners in the
case contended that EPA, in delisting coal and oil EGUs, violated the plain text and structure of section 112(c)(9) delisting
requirements. During the trial the EPA admitted that it had not,
and could not make the findings required under CCA Section
112(c)(9) for delisting a HAP source. However, EPA offered
three arguments for the legitimacy of its decision, regardless of
the section 112(c)(9).
First, EPA contended that its decision was justified through
its interpretation of section 112(n)(1)(A) which requires EPA
Administrator to conduct a study of each HAP listed in section
112. Following the study, EPA determines whether it is “necessary and appropriate,” to regulate EGU as HAP sources. EPA
contended that section 112(n)(1)(A) does not restrict the agency
from reviewing previous decisions of “necessary and appropri-

The court found no
ambiguity in section 112
and held that the
EPA’s argument
“deploys the logic of
the Queen of Hearts,
substituting EPA’s desires
for the plain text…”

In 1970, Congress amended
the Clean Air Act, adding section 112, requiring EPA to list
and regulate hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”) that “cause, or
contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness.”3 In response to
the EPAs extremely slow application of section 112, Congress
returned to the issue of HAPs in 1990 by strengthening section
112 to require EPA to list and regulate over one hundred specific
HAPs. The amended section 112 required that EPA regulate
all new and existing sources of HAPs to reflect the “maximum
reduction in emissions which can be achieved by application of
the best available control technology.” 4 Additionally, section
112(c)(9) restricted EPAs ability to delist a HAP source without
first determining that “emissions from no source is the category
or subcategory concerned . . . exceed a level which is adequate
to protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no
adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from
any source.”5
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ate” listings of EGUs. If EPA finds that a listing of source EGUs
had not in fact been “necessary and appropriate,” it contended
that it could delist those sources without meeting the delisting
requirements of section 112(c)(9). Secondly, EPA argued that
the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation of section
112, stating that it is ambiguous and calls into question whether
EGUs should be regulated at all. Finally, EPA pointed out that
it has previously delisted HAP sources without satisfying the
requirements of section 112(c)(9).

HoldingS
As for EPA’s first argument, the court agreed that typically
agencies may reverse a previous “administrative determination
or ruling where the agency has a principled basis for doing so.”9
However, Congress has the power to restrict an agency’s ability
to reverse its self. The Court found that the delisting restriction
in section 112(c)(9) represented an expressed limit on EPA’s
discretion to delist HAP sources. Furthermore, the Court found
that EPA’s position would nullify section 112(c)(9) and allow
the agency to delist any source without regard for the statutory
delisting process.10
In analyzing EPA’s request for judicial deference the court
utilized the two-pronged test laid out in Chevron. Under the first
prong of the test the court looked to determine if “Congress has
directly spoken to the . . . issue.”11 Looking at the plain language of the statute, the court pointed to section 112(c)(6) where
Congress expressly discusses regulation of EGUs.12 The court
found no ambiguity in section 112 and held that the EPA’s argument “deploys the logic of the Queen of Hearts, substituting
EPA’s desires for the plain text . . .”13 Finally, the court found
EPA’s third argument unconvincing, pointing out that previous
examples of statutory violations are not an excuse for current
violations.14
Finding all three of EPAs arguments without merit, the court
vacated the delisting of coal- and oil-fired EGUs. Under EPAs
own interpretations, the mercury regulation under CAMR created within CCA section 111 cannot be used to regulate sources
listed in section 112. With this in consideration, the Court also
vacated CAMR and remanded it to EPA for reconsideration.
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ConCluSion
Environmental groups have hailed the Court’s ruling as a
victory for the health of all Americans by invalidating an attempt
by EPA to get around the much stricter standards required by
CCA section 112 with a weak cap-and-trade program under
CAMR.15 The petitioners contended that the cap-and-trade program would have done little to cap mercury in the short term
and would have delayed any actual reductions by a decade or
more.16 After the decision, one petitioner’s attorney stated, “We
hope the administration will gain some new respect for the law
in its last year and start working to protect Americans from pollution and stop working to shield polluters from their lawful
cleanup obligations.”17

Spring 2008

54

